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LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
area of law which is stricti juris like privileges, there is no room
to make any concessions.
As a question of getting at legislative intent or as a matter
of re-examining policy considerations on the issue of the prin-
cipal case, there is room for a different point of view. The
current Civil Code provision 14 and all its antecedents to 180815
gave the protection of a privilege to those who did direct work
or who supplied materials for a construction or repair job.
Planiol refers to this privilege as coming from the old French
law with even older Roman origins, and he gives as the reason
for the privilege that the creditor has contributed something to
the patrimony of another.8 Since 1916, the Louisiana statutes
have superseded the Code provisions, and with the increasingly
complex operations involved in modern construction and repair
work, the scope of the statutory protection has been expanded
to include more categories of protected creditors and secured
claims for necessary services and supplies which contributed to
the accomplishment of the job.
In the drafting of the current statute, there was probably
no thought given specifically to the lessor of machinery who
performs no work. Since this area of the law must remain one
of stricti juris, the only proper answer is one of legislative con-
sideration. In this process, it might well be an improvement
toward clarification if the category of those who contribute
services be treated separately from the category of those who
furnish supplies, instead of having two complicated subject
elements and two separate verb phrases in one clause of a much
longer sentence which in turn incorporates a variety of other




The case of Boyet v. Perryman' raises several points of in-
14. LA. CIVIL CODE art. 3249(2, 3) (1870).
15. Compiled Edition of the Civil Codes of Louisiana, under Art. 3249.
16. 2 PLANIOL, TREATISE ON THE CIVIL LAW no. 2913 et seq. (Eng. transl.
1959).
*Professor of Law, Louisiana State University.
1. 240 La. 339, 123 So.2d 79 (1960), reversing 98 So.2d 593 (La. App. 2d
Cir. 1957).
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terest. These comments deal with the issues of good faith and
just title; the discussion of estoppel by warranty appears else-
where. 2
Good faith. Article 3481 of the Civil Code provides: "Good
faith is always presumed in matters of prescription; and he who
alleges bad faith in the possessor, must prove it." One aspect of
this presumption seems to be the long-established rule that a
possessor need not "examine the title" of his acquisition. On the
other hand, if he does undertake a title examination, he is re-
sponsible for everything in the records even though his partic-
ular investigation did not discover it. In this latter situation,
the good faith presumption is deemed rebutted.
A further judicial development in this matter is the conclu-
sion that in some situations the known facts suffice to serve as a
warning and that further inquiry is called for. Where this duty
exists, there is responsibility again for everything in the records
although in fact no such investigation was made. By this whit-
tling away process, the strength and significance of the good
faith presumption is considerably weakened despite the same
honest subjective belief in perfect ownership.
This is what happened in the present case. Two children sold
and conveyed to the other children "all of our right, title and
interest in the estates of our deceased father . . . and mother,"
referring to the property described in the judgment of possession
in the succession proceedings. When the significance of this con-
veyance was examined, the court concluded that the reference
for a property description was "sufficient notice to put the
plaintiffs on their guard and to make inquiry into the records."
Accordingly, the parties who relied on this transaction were
deemed to have the knowledge of what the public records would
have disclosed (that the original owner had sold the disputed
property before his death), and with this knowledge they lacked
the good faith requirement for the ten-year acquisitive prescrip-
tion.
The concept that where known facts are "sufficient to excite
inquiry, a duty devolved upon him to investigate the title" was
first clearly established in the fairly recent case of Juneau v.
2. Note, 22 LoUISIANA LAW REvi w 499 (1962).
3. 123 So.2d at 83.
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Laborde,4 where the issue of good faith was completely separate
from any confusion with the question of just title. It is surpris-
ing that the Juneau case was not cited in either the court of ap-
peal or Supreme Court opinions.
Just title. It is often difficult to separate the elements of
good faith and just title because some of them occasionally over-
lap. A just title is necessarily a defective title, but one which
purports to transfer ownership and which appears on its face
to be good.5 In the present case, the court found that the deed in
question did not constitute a just title because it did not purport
to transfer the ownership of the property in dispute. The deed
contained no description of the disputed property, and the con-
veyance of all their rights in their parents' estates could not in-
clude property which had been alienated by the father inter
vivos.
Impliedly, the deed in the present case would be not only a
just title but a good title with reference to the property that
actually was in the parents' estates although not described be-
yond the reference to the succession proceedings. This question
of adequacy of description through incorporation by reference
was directly dealt with in the case of Bruce v. Cheramie but the
question must remain for individualization according to the facts
and circumstances of each case.
Acquisitive Prescription (Thirty-Year)
An unusual situation for the application of the thirty-year
acquisitive prescription occurred in Watson v. Crown Zellerbach
Corporation.7 In the conveyance of a tract of land, the descrip-
tion exceeded the intent of the transferor but the excess was
never delivered. Instead, the transferor continued to possess this
strip as part of the adjacently owned land. The possession of
this strip had all the attributes of being open, notorious, corpo-
real, and as owner, and there was complete proof of.this actual
possession for over thirty years. Accordingly, their prescriptive
4. 219 La. 921, 54 So.2d 325 (1951) ; see Work of the Louisiana Supreme
Court for the 1951-1952 Term -Prescription, 13 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW 264
(1953)..
5. LA. CIVIL CODE arts. 3483-3486 (1870).
6. 231 La. 881, 93 So.2d 202 (1956) ; see Work of the Louisiana Supreme
Court for the 1956-1957 Term -Prescription, 18 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW 53
(1957).
7. 240 La. 500, 124 So.2d 138 (1960), affirming 110 So.2d 862 (La. App. 1st
Cir. 1959).
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title was sustained. It does not necessarily follow from this de-
cision that a demand by the transferee (of the strip uninten-
tionally included in the deed description), before the lapse of
thirty years, could not be met successfully by other defenses to
prevent him from obtaining the extra strip which was not in-
tended for him in the first place.8
Tacking
Another problem involving an "extra strip" of land was dealt
with in Stutson v. McGee.0 The defendant pleaded the thirty-
year acquisitive prescription against the plaintiff's recorded
claim of title. The defendant's own possession was just a little
short (29 years and 10 months) but he proposed to supplement
this with the additional possession of his predecessor from whom
he had purchased the adjacent land. However, while there was
chronological continuity in the physical possessions, there was
no juridical link or privity between the possessors because the
strip in question was not included in the conveyance description.
Accordingly, the previous possessor was not the defendant's
author in title, and tacking of the possessions was not permit-
ted.10 With only 49 days left to complete a thirty-year prescrip-
tion, it could not be much consolation for the defendant to recog-
nize the truth of lex dura lex.
MINERAL RIGHTS
George W. Hardy, III*
Rights of Usufructuary and Naked Owner
The decision rendered in Gueno v. Medlenka' left many ques-
tions unanswered. 2 Fundamentally that decision applied Article
5523 of the Civil Code governing the rights of a usufructuary in
mines and quarries as determinative of the relative rights of a
8. Of. LA. CrvIL CODE arts. 1819, 1842 et seq., 1861, 2494-5, 2589 et seq., 2665
(1870). Also, the possibility of reformation for mutual error, Wilson v. Levy, 234
La. 719, 101 So.2d 214 (1958), and Ker v. Evershed, 41 La. Ann. 15, 6 So. 566(1889).
9. 241 La. 646, 130 So.2d 403 (1961).
10. LA. CIVIL CODE arts. 3493-4 (1870).
*Associate Professor of Law, Louisiana State University.
1. 238 La. 1081, 117 So.2d 817 (1960).
2. For a discussion of some of the problems raised by Gueno v. Medlenka, see
34 TIu. L. REV. 784 (1960) and 20 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEw 773 (1960).
3. LA. CIVIL CODE art. 552 (1870): "The usufructuary has a right to the
enjoyment and proceeds of mines and quarries in the land subject to the usufruct,
